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ILLEGITIMATES AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
Illegitimates often have been discriminated against by legisla-
tures in the enactment of statutes, as well as by courts which have 
sanctioned such legislation. This article will examine the judicial 
response to legislative treatment of the illegitimate in social insur-
ance, loss compensation, and intestacy statutes. Emphasizing the 
Supreme Court's analysis of the legal status of illegitimates in 
terms of the equal protection clause, it will also discuss how the 
principle of equal protection may be applied in order to reduce the 
number of illegitimates denied the benefit and protection of the 
law. 
I. THE LEGAL STATUS OF ILLEGITIMATES 
A. Social Insurance Legislation 
Several federal statutes, including the Social Security Act, 1 con-
tain provisions which discriminate against illegitimates seeking the 
benefits available under these social insurance programs. Although 
such provisions rarely make benefits explicitly 1,1naltainable, ben-
efits may nevertheless be denied by imposing a greater burden of 
proof on illegitimate claimants than upon legitimate claimants.2 
For example, under the Social Security Act, children's benefits 
may be payable when a parent qualifies for a retirement or disabil-
ity pension, or when the insured parent dies. 3 To be considered 
eligible for Social Security benefits based upon the contributions of 
an insured parent, the illegitimate must first be deemed a "child" 
within the Act's provisions. 4 The Act, however, declares the il-
legitimate to be prima facie ineligible5 and grants "child" status 
only if, in addition to establishing paternity, 6 the illegitimate can 
'42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
2 See, e.g., the text accompanying notes 9-10 infra. See also Semmel, Social Security 
Benefits for Illegitimate Children after Levy v. Lousiana, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 289 (1970). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(I) (Supp. V 1975). 
• 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(I) (Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (Supp. V 1975). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(l) (Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (Supp. V 1975). 
6 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii) (1970) ("[S]';lch insured in?ividual is shown bv 
evidence satisfactory to the secretary to be the father of the applicant. ... "). 
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meet one of several other qualifying conditions. The illegitimate 
may be deemed a "child" if the applicable state intestacy statute 
makes the person an heir7 or if the parents' marriage ceremony was 
invalidated on technical grounds. 8 Additionally, the illegitimate 
may qualify if he obtains a written acknowledgement of paternity, a 
judicial decree of paternity, or a judicial support order.9 The il-
legitimate may also be deemed a "child" if the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare is satisfied with respect to paternity and 
proof of dependency exists at the time of the event insured 
against. 10 
As a result, illegitimate claimants are required to present proof of 
paternity as well as proof of some other factor indicative of a 
"family" relationship. The latter burden weighs most heavily on 
those illegitimates who must prove actual dependency at the time 
of the event insured against. In contrast, proof of dependency is 
not required of legitimate children since there is a statutory pre-
sumption in their favor. 11 In effect, the statute favors legitimate 
children regardless of their· actual dependency. While proof of 
dependency is not required of illegitimates qualifying under the 
7 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1970). 
8 42 U .S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) (1970). 
• 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i) (1970). Section 416(h)(3) read.sin relevant part: 
(3) An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured indi-
vidual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual 
under paragraph (2) of this subsection [i.e., the intestacy and invalid marriage 
qualifications], shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured 
individual if: 
(A) in the case of an insured individual entitled to old-age insurance benefits 
(i) such insured individual-
({) has acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or daughter, 
(II) has been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant, or 
(III) has been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the 
applicant because the applicant is his son or daughter, 
and such acknowledgement, court decree, or court order was made not less than 
one year before such insured individual became entitled to old-age insurance 
benefits or attained age 65, whichever is earlier .... 
10 42 U .S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). (C)(ii). Section 416(h)(3)(A)(ii) reads in part: 
(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary to be 
the father of the applicant and was living with or contributing to the support of the 
applicant at the time such insured individual became entitled to benefits .... 
Section 416(h)(3)(B) repeats this language but with respect to individuals entitled to disabil-
ity insurance benefits; § 416(h)(3)(C) does the same for those entitled to death benefits. 
11 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970) reads in part as follows: 
(3) A child shall be deemed dependent ... unless ... such individual [i.e., an 
(adopting) father or (adopting) mother] was not living with or contributing to the 
support of such child and--
(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or 
(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual. 
For purposes of this paragraph, a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently 
insured individual pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B) or section 416(h)(3) of this title 
shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such individual. 
Despite the omission of a reference to section 416(h)(2)(A) in this section, the Court has 
determined that children qualifying via that provision are deemed dependent as well. 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
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intestacy, invalid marriage, or proof by document provisions of the 
Act, the illegitimate child unable to offer evidence of a parental 
relationship is required to prove dependency in fact to receive 
benefits under the Social Security Act. 
In two recent decisions concerning illegitimacy, the Supreme 
Court has reached different conclusions with respect to the pre-
sumption of dependency. In Jimenez v. Weinberger, 12 the claim-
ants were the illegitimate, dependent children of a disabled worker. 
The dependency presumption was unavailable to them by virtue of 
their illegitimacy and the inapplicability of the statute's special 
qualifying provisions. 13 Moreover, because tl;i..@Y were born after 
the onset of the disability, the children were unable to prove their 
dependency "at the time" that their father's disability was sus-
tained, as the Act required. The Court, however, used an equal 
protection analysis to reverse the denial of their benefits by pro-
bing the rationality of the relation between the legislative means 
and ends and the extent to which the statutory result reflected the 
statutory purpose. The Court determined that the exclusion of 
these illegitimates was not "reasonably related to the prevention of 
spurious claims," and that "it would not serve the purposes of the 
Act to conclusively deny them an opportunity to establish their 
dependency." 14 
Mathews v. Lucas 15 involved illegitimate children whose father 
died following an absence of several years from the home. As a 
result, they were unable to prove dependency "at the time" of his 
death. Despite the demonstrable fact that the iµsured had lived 
with the family for the eighteen years prior to his departure, the 
Court upheld the denial of benefits finding no violation of equal 
protection. 16 The statutory classification which excluded these 
children was justified, in part, on the grounds of administrative 
convenience. The Court also found the classification permissible 
because it was "reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency 
at death." 17 
The Act's unfavorable treatment of illegitimates has not been 
confined to the provisions challenged in Jimene·z and Lucas. Until 
recently, illegitimates of a particular class were the first members 
of a "family" to have their benefits reduced if the total benefits 
received by the household exceeded the statutory maximum. 18 
12 417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
13 See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra. 
1 • 417 U.S. at 636. 
15 427 U .s. 495 (1976). 
16 /d. at 516. 
11 Id. at 509. 
18 42 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 403(a) (Supp. V 1975)), 
originally excluded those illegitimates qualifyil)g via § 4l6(h)(3). 
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This policy was justified on the ground that such a scheme rea-
sonably reflected the greater probability that certain groups of 
children were more likely to be dependent than others, 19 even 
though these children were statutorily entitled to the same pre-
sumption of dependency as legitimates, or had, in fact, earned that 
status by proving their dependency. Later challenges, however, 
successfully attacked the provision as impermissibly discrimina-
tory insofar as it lacked any rational justification. 20 
In addition to the Social Security Act, numerous other federal 
statutes provide similar payments of benefits for federal employees 
and their dependents. 21 The illegitimate's receipt of benefits is 
often conditioned on qualifying as ·a "child" as defined in each 
statute,22 with some statutes imposing a dependency requirement 
as well.23 Benefits have also been conditioned upon a finding that a 
"recognized natural child" lives in a "regular parent-child rela-
tionship" with the person covered by the particular statute. 24 
These limitations may be discriQJ.inatory, not only with respect to 
illegitimates, but also with respect to any nontraditional family 
relationship, such as single-parent families, communal households, 
homosexual parenthood, and older-sibling parenthood. Strict in-
terpretation of such restrictions would result in the denial of ben-
efits to claimants in these situations. In the event that the limitation 
will be litigated, th_e courts may construe the standard in accor-
dance with the liberal interpretation generally given to benefit 
statutes. 25 
19 Watts v. Veneman, 334 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1971), affd in part, rev'd in part, 476 
F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1973); P-arker v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 453 F.2d 850 
(5th Cir. 1972). 
20 Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972) (invidious discrimination found 
against§ 416(h)(3) illegitimates), and.Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Md. 1972) 
(same), both aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). Accord, Maracle v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 
234 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Williams v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Morris v. 
Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 464 
(1973). 
21 E.g., Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8348 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 
Federal Employees Health Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8913 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 
Federal Survivors Benefit Plan, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-1455 (Supp. V 1975); Foreign Services 
Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1121 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
22 Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U .S.C § 8341 (Supp. V 1975); Federal Employees 
Health Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8901 (1970); Federal Survivors Benefit Plan, IO U.S.C. § 
1447 (Supp. V 1975); Foreign Services Act, 22 U .S.C § 1064 (1970). 
23 Federal Survivors Benefit Plan, 10 U.S.C. § 1447 (Supp. V 1975); Foreign Services Act, 
22 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970); 37 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1975). 
24 Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1975); Federal 
Employees Health Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8901(5)(8) (1970); Federal Survivors Benefit 
Plan, 10 U .S.C. § 1447(5)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1975). 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 292 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1961); 
Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934). See also Miller v. Laird, 349 
F. Supp. 1034 (D.D.C. 1972) (Dependents Medical Care Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1088 (1970 
& Supp. V 1975), violated the equal protection clause by gratuitously excluding any illegiti-
mate from its coverage, 10 U .S.C. § 1072.). 
SPRING 1977) Illegitimates and Equal Protection 547 
Entitlement to benefits, however, should rest on a firmer found-
ation than the personal sympathies of the judge. In this respect, the 
"regular parent-child relationship" concept may be vulnerable to a 
challenge based upon vagueness and possible overbreadth. While 
such a flaw might be remedied using language more explicitly 
describing the aspect of the insured-claimant relationship on which 
Congress desires to condition the receipt of benefits, any attempt 
to draw these new lines too narrowly would raise equal protection 
issues. 26 
B. Loss Compensation Statutes 
The difficulties faced by illegitimates claiming support benefits 
are also present in statutes providing compensation for the losses 
suffered by the claimant upon the wrongful or work-related death 
of the parent. 27 In general, illegitimates have received more favor-
able treatment where federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction 
to interpret a federal compensation statute,28 than where jurisdic-
tion is shared with state courts.29 Federal courts have tended to 
avoid reliance on analogous state law, even where the structure 
and language of the federal act appear to warrant such reliance. For 
example, although the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance 
Act30 establishes a hierarchy of claimants to the death benefits by 
using language characteristic of many state intestate succession 
laws,31 the federal courts, in accord with the Act's beheficial, 
26 See, e.g., notes 75-79 & 141-49 and accompanying texts infra. 
27 E.g., Federal Group Life Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (1970& Supp. V 1975); 
National Service Life Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C § 801 (1970); Servicemen's Group Life 
Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. § 770 (1970); Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 
(1970); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U .S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970); Jones Act, 46 U .S.C. § 688 
(1970). 
28 See Hebert v. Petroleum Pipe Inspectors, Inc., 396 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1968) (Jones Act, 
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970)); Civil v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954) (Death on 
the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970)); Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., Inc., 
70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. l934)(same); Hamilton Co., Inc. v. Canal Barge Co., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 
978 (E.D. La. 1975) (same). See generally Note, Illegitimates: Definition of "Children" 
under Federal Welfare Legislation, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 984 (1967). 
29 Compare Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., Inc., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir: 1934) 
(holding that federal law permits the inclusion of illegitimates within the statute's scope), 
with Willis v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 405 U.S. 318 (1972) (per curiam) (an equally-divided 
Court upholding a Georgia state court's decision to define the term "child" in construing the 
Serviceman's Group Life Insurance Act, 38 U .S.C. § 770 (1970), with reference to local law, 
Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Willis, 227 Ga. 619, 182 S.E.2d 420 (1971)). See also Dobyns v. 
Prudential Life Ins. Co., 227 Ga. 253, 179 S.E.2d 915 (1971). 
au 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
31 5 U. S.C. § 8705 (1970) reads in part: 
(a) The amount of group life insurance ... shall be paid ... in the following order 
of precedence: 
First, to the beneficiary .... 
Second, if there is no designated beneficiary, to the widow or widower of the 
employee. 
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remedial nature, have generally chosen to interpret it in terms of 
support or loss compensation rather than in terms of property 
distribution on intestacy. 32 This interpretation has the advantage of 
avoiding the incorporation of inconsistent state legislation and its 
often unfavorable application· to the claims of illegitimates. 33 In 
cases involving federal statutes which operate independently of 
state law, the federal courts have found a similar congressional 
intent to compensate the recipient for loss of society and care34 or, 
simply, to bestow a benefit.35 The reliance of federal courts on 
federal common law in interpreting loss compensation statutes 
should continue to benefit illegitimates in the future. The occa-
sional intrusion of state law, 36 however, is a reminder of the pre-
carious status which illegitimates now enjoy. 
At the state level, illegitimates have gained increased access to 
compensation benefits as a result of several recent decisions. In 
Levy v. Louisiana 37 and Giana v. American Guarantee & Liability 
Insurance Co., 38 the Supreme <:;:ourt sharply curtailed the ability of 
states to discriminate against illegitimates in wrongful death statute 
cases that involved Louisiana's wrongful death statute39 which 
denied a cause of action to illegitimates for the death of their 
mother and to a mother for the death of her illegitimate son. 
In Levy, five illegitimate children sued for damages for the 
wrongful death of their mother. Concluding that distinctions drawn 
on the basis of the claimant's birth status bore "no relation to the 
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother," the Court 
held that these distinctions constituted invidious discrimination 
against illegitimates in violation of the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment. 40 Similarly, in Giana the Court found 
"no possible rational basis" for assuming that the policy of dis-
Third, if none of the above, to the child or children of the employee and 
descendants of deceased children by representation. 
Fourth, if none of the above, to the parents of the employee or the survivor of 
them. 
Fifth, if none of the above, to the duly appointed executor or administrator of 
the estate of the employee. 
Sixth, if none of the above, to other next of kin of the employee entitled under 
the laws of the domicile of the employee at the date of his death. 
32 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 368 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1966); Brantley v. 
Skeens, 266 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Varker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 
159 (M.D.N.C. 1960). 
33 See, e.g., the statutes cited in notes 50-54 infra. 
34 Tune v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 223 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1963) (Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970)). 
35 United States v. Philippine Nat'I Bank, 292 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (National Service 
Life Insurance Act, 38 .U .S.C. § 801 (1970)). 
36 See note 29 supra. 
37 391 u .s. 68 (1968). 
38 Id. at 73. 
39 LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1967) (amended 1973). 
40 391 U.S. at 72. 
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couraging illegitimacy would be undermined by permitting a 
natural mother to be compensated under the statute for the wrong-
ful death of her illegitimate child.41 
The Court followed a similar approach in Weber v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co., 42 where two illegitimate children of the decedent 
sought to be included as "children" under the Louisiana work-
men's compensation statute. 43 The statute classified illegitimate 
children as "other dependents," who were entitled to recover only 
if the statutorily limited award had not been exhausted by prior 
takers, which included the decedent's legitimate children. The 
Weber Court was unable to perceive a "significant relationship" 
between the discriminatory means employed by the statute and the 
statutory purpose of providing support for the dependents of the 
decedent. 44 Consequently, the provision was held to violate the 
equal protection clause. 45 As in Glona, the Court concluded that 
the state's interest in· discouraging illicit sexual activity between 
adults \:Vas not effectively furthered by the discriminatory classifi-
cation of illegitimate children. 46 
C. Intestate Succession Statutes 
Intestate succession has long been considered a matter of state 
concem.47 Uniform treatment of illegitimates under intestacy sta-
tutes became impossible as states pursued different courses in 
mitigating the harsh common law attitude towards illegitimates. 
Although the doctrine of nullius filius (the child of no one) is no 
longer the letter of the law in any state, its spirit is still felt. 48 With 
41 Id. at 75. 
42 406 u .s. 164 (1972). 
43 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23.1232 (West 1967). 
44 406 U.S. at 175. 
45 Id. at 176. 
46 Id. See generally Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. 
Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., I 18 U. PA. L. REV. 
I (1969); Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477 (I967);Note' 
Discrimination Based upon I/legitimacy as a Denial of Equal Protection, 43 TUL. L. REV. 
383 (1969); Comment, Providing for Illegitimates-Workmen's Compensation, 19 Lov. L. 
REv. 242 (1973); Comment, A Decision on Illegitimacy: A Quest For Equality, 34 U. PITT. 
L. REv. 472 (1973); Recent Developments, 18 VILL. L. REV. 759 (1973); Recent Develop-
ments, 44 WASH. L. REV. 523 (1969). 
47 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164; 170 (1972); Seaboard Air Lines Ry. v. 
Kenney, 240 U.S. 489, 490 (1916). But see Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395 (S. Ct. 
Apr. 26, 1977). See generally Note, Inheritance Rights of I/legitimate Children Under the 
Equal Protection Clause, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1336 (1970). 
48 In its earliest forms, the common law doctrine deemed the illegitimate to have no 
inheritable blood nor any rights of inheritance from either parent. W. HOOPER, THE LAW OF 
ILLEGITIMACY 25-27 (191 I). Although the burden has been eased generally, specific inclu-
sion of illegitimates in various statutes is often required to overcome the common law bias 
against them. ' 
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the exception of Louisiana, 49 all states permit an illegitimate child 
to inherit automatically from the natural mother ,50 and some states 
allow inheritance from the mother's kindred as well. 51 Most states 
allow illegitimates to succeed to their father's intestate estate, 
however, only on proof of paternity and his acknowledgment or 
recognition of the child as his own.52 In some states inheritance 
49 According to the Louisiana scheme·, there are two kinds of illegitimate childre11: those 
born to parents who are capable of marrying each other, and those born to parents whose 
marriage is prevented by some legal impediment. LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 181 (West 1952). 
Only those born to parents free to marry each other are capable of being acknowledged by 
either parent, thereby earning the designation "natural child;" those illegitimates not so 
fortunate are termed "bastards," either adulterous, id. art. 182, or incestuous, id. art. 183, 
depending upon the nature of the impediment to their parents' marriage. 
Illegitimates are not entitled to inherit until acknowledged; if not acknowledged, the law 
grants them nothing more than a "mere alimony" interest. Id. art. 920. An acknowledged 
natural child can inherit from the mother to the exclusion of her kindred, but not to the 
exclusion of lawful children and descendants. Id. art. 918. An acknowledged natural child 
can inherit from its father only to the exclusion of the state. Id. art. 919. 
50 ALA. CODE tit. 16, § 7 (1959); ALASKA STAT.§ 13.11.045 (1972); Aruz. REV. STAT.§ 
14-2109 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141 (1971); CAL. PROB. CoDE § 255 (West 1975); 
CoLO. REV. STAT.§ 15-11-109 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 45-274 (West 1960); DEL. 
CoDE tit. 12, § 508 (Supp. 1976); D.C. CooE § 19-316 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 731.29 
(West 1964); GA. CooE ANN. § 113-904 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 532-6 (1969); IDAHO 
CoDE § 15-2-109 (Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); IND. 
CooE ANN.§ 29-1-2-7 (Bums 1972); IOWA CoDE § 633.221 (1975); KAN. STAT.§ 59-501 
(1964); KY. REv. STAT.§ 391.090(1972); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 1003 (1965); Mo. EST. & 
TRUSTS CoDE ANN. § 1-208 (1974); MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 190, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 
1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 702.81 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 525.172 (West 1975); 
Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 91-1-15 (1972); Mo. REv. STAT.§ 474.060 (1969); MoNT. REv. CooEs 
ANN. § 91A-2-109 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.170 
(1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 561.4 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 3A:4-7 (West 1953); N.M. 
STAT. ANN.§ 32A-2-109 (1975); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 4-1.2 (McKinney 
1967); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 29-18 (1976); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 30.1-04-09 (1976); OHIO REv. 
CODE ANN.§ 2105.17 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West 1970); ORE. REV. 
STAT.§ 112. 105 (1975); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 2107 (Purdon 1975); P.R. LAWS ANN. 
tit. 31, § 441 (Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 33-1-8 (1969); S.C. CODE§ 19-53 (1962); S.D. 
COMPILED LAWS ANN.§ 29-1-15 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 31-114 (Supp. 1976); TEX. 
PROB. CODE ANN. ch. 2, § 42 (Vernon 1956); UTAH CooE ANN. § 74-4-10 (1953), but UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 75-2-109 (1975) (effective July I, 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (1974); 
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 84 (1964); VA. CODE§ 64.1-5 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 
11.04.081 (1967); w. VA. CODE § 42-1-5 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West 1971); 
WYO. STAT. § 2-44 (1957). 
51 ALA. CODE tit. 16, § 7 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 61-141 (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 45-274 (West 1960); D.C. CooE § 19-316 (1973); HAW. REv. STAT. § 532-6 (1969); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Bums 
1972); low A CooE § 633.221 (1975); KY. REV. STAT. § 391.090 (1972); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 
18 § 1003 (1965); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 190, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1969); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN.§ 702.81 (1970); Miss. CooE ANN.§ 91-i-15 (1972); Mo. REv. STAT.§ 474.060 
(1969); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 134.170 (1973); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561.4 (1973); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 3A:4-7 (West 1953); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967); 
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 29.18 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2105.17 (Page 1976); ORE. REv. 
STAT.§ 112.105 (1975); S.C. CODE§ 19-53 (1962); 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 2107 (Purdon 
1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 29-1-15 (1967); TEx. PRoB. CooE ANN. ch. 2, § 42 
(Vernon 1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (1974); VA. CODE§ 64.1-5 (1973); WASH. REv. 
CODE ANN. § 11.04.081 (1967); w. VA. CODE § 42-1-5 (1966). 
52 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.29 (West 1964); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Bums 1972); low A 
CQDE § 633.222 (1975); KAN. STAT.§ 59-501 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 1003 (1965); 
Mo. E_ST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.§ 1-208 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 702.83 (Supp. 
1976)_; MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 525.172 (West 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 134.170 (1973); N.Y. 
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from paternal kindred is also permitted.53 The Uniform Probate 
Code, adopted in ten jurisdictions,54 has done much to equalize the 
status of all children by focusing on the biological relationship 
between parent and child as the primary qualification for intestate 
succession. 55 
Although the Supreme Court has not required uniformity of state 
intestate succession schemes, the equal protection doctrine has 
been used to establish minimum standards of fairness for illegiti-
mates. In Labine v. Vincent, 56 the Court indicated that the states 
were entitled to exercise their individual judgments with respect to 
intestate succession. Labine involved an equal protection chal-
lenge to a Louisiana statute which permitted the acknowledged, 
illegitimate children of a deceased father to share in the estate only 
to the exclusion of the state. 57 The Court, with only a minor 
reference to the equal protection issue,58 deferred to Louisiana's 
prerogatives in the area, upholding the state's interest in control-
ling the intestate distribution of property within its borders.59 
EsT., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 4.-1.2 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 29-18 (1976); 
OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2105.17 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West 1970); 
ORE. REv. STAT.§ 112.105 (1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.§ 29-1-15 (1967); UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 74-4-10 (1953), but UTAH CODE ANN.§ 75-2-109 (1975) (effective July I, 1977); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (1974); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN.§ 11.04.081 (1%7); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West 1971). 
53 IND. CoDE ANN.§ 29-1-2-7 (Bums 1972); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 18, § 1003 (1%5); N.C. 
GEN. STAT.§ 29-18; (1976); ORE. REv. STAT.§ I 12.105 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 
(1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West 1971). 
54 ALASKA STAT.§ 13.11.045 (1972); ARIZ. REv. STAT.§ 14-2109 (1975); CoLo. REv. 
STAT.§ 15-11-109 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 508 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 
91A-2-109 (1975); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 30-2309 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 32A-2-109 (1976); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-109 (1975) (effective July I, 1977). See Gordon & Wellman, 
Uniformity in State Inheritance Laws: How UPC Article II Has Fared in Nine Enactments, 
1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 357 (1976). 
55 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has published two 
versions of§ 2-109, the provision defining "child .. for the Uniform Probate Code. The 
earlier version is the 011e adopted by state legislatures to date, and reads in relevant part: 
(2) ... a person born out of wedlock is a child of the mother. That person is also a 
child of the father, if: 
(i) the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the 
birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or 
(ii) the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father 
or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, but th~ paternity 
established under this subparagraph is ineffective to qualify the father or his 
kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly treated 
the child as his. and has not refused to support the child. 
UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE § 2-109 (as approved in 1969). The section was later 
revised in order to reconcile its policy with that of the Uniform Parentage Act: "(2) 
... a person is the child of its parents regardless of the marital status of its parents 
and the parent and child relationship may be established under the [Uniform 
Parentage Act]." UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE § 2-109 (as approved in 1973). For an 
example of the Uniform Parentage Act as enacted, see CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 7000-
7019 (West Supp. 1976). 
56 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
57 LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1952). 
56 401 U.S. at 536 n.6. Four dissenting members found a violation of equal protection, id. 
at 541. using the rational basis test. Id. at 548. 
59 Id. _at 536-37. 
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Despite this traditional judicial deference, the prerogatives of 
state governments have recently been restricted by the require-
ments of the equal protection doctrine. In the recent case of Trim-
ble v. Gordon, 60 the Court, after acknowledging a state's "primary 
responsibility" in establishing an intestate succession scheme,61 
reaffirmed the applicability of the equal protection clause as a 
means of "vindicating constitutional rights" 62 and held that the 
Illinois intestacy statute, which permitted illegitimates to inherit 
only from their mothers, was unconstitutional.63 Speaking for the 
majority, Justice Powell indicated that Labine was distinguishable 
since the Louisiana statute reflected different legislative purposes 
than the Illinois statute considered in Trimble. The opinion in 
Trimble clearly stated, however, that its "more recent analysis" 
will control future treatment of the issue. 64 
The Court's treatment of the equal protection question in Labine 
could perhaps have been attributed to the tradition of federal 
deference to the states in matters of intestacy, and to the strength 
of the states' interest in property distribution.65 The demonstrated 
vulnerability of Louisiana's legislative treatment of illegitimates66 
should have prompted a more extensive equal protection analysis. 
In particular, the state interest in protecting the orderly distribution 
of intestate property from the disruptive intrusion of "lost" or 
"hidden" heirs is arguably neither furthered by, nor rationally 
related to, a legislative classification which places acknowledged, 
illegitimate children of the deceased after all other related takers of 
the estate. The Labine Court bypassed this approach in light of the 
traditional deference to state intestacy policy. The Court's most 
recent discussion of this issue,67 however, established Labine as an 
anomaly and indicated that the Court was returning to a more 
"traditional equal protection analysis" based on the relationship 
between statutory discrimination and the promotion of state objec-
tives. 68 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION 
Modem analysis of the equal protection clause69 requires that 
discrimination be examined on a level of judicial scrutiny deter-
60 45 U.S.L.W. 4395 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977). 
61 Id. at 4397. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 4399. 
64 Id. at 4399 n.17. 
65 401 U.S. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegiti-
mates, Inheritance and the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DICK. L. REv. 377 (1971). 
66 See notes 37-46 and accompanying text supra. 
67 Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977). 
6 & Id. at 4398. 
69 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § I. The actions of the federal government are similarly 
constrained by the equal protection concept of the fifth amendment. See, e.g .. Shapiro v. 
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mined by the subject matter of the legislation, the nature of the 
groups being affected, and the importance of the competing inter-
ests. Legislative classifications will be invalidated if they fail to 
meet the tests appropriate to the level of scrutiny employed. 70 
Some equal protection challenges have concerned legislative 
classifications which discriminate against illegitimate children and 
in favor of legitimate children, such as state intestacy statutes. In 
other cases, however, the challenged classification has distin-
guished between groups of illegitimates. The Louisiana illegitimacy 
scheme71 and the Social Security Act's dependency presump-
Hons72 were both challenged on such grounds. In evaluating these 
classifications in terms of the equal protection clause, it should be 
noted that, while a particular provision may not have discriminated 
against all illegitimates, the persons discriminated against were in 
all cases illegitimate. As a result, the overriding question has been 
the permissibility of using birth status as a basis for legislative 
classification. 
A. Strict Scrutiny 
During the 196O's the Supreme Court developed a two-tier 
method of equal protection analysis,73 supplementing the tradi-
tional minimal level of scrutiny with a new stricter examination. 
The more exacting level of scrutiny is employed when the legisla-
tion involves either a "suspect classification" or a "fundamental 
interest." 74 
Classifications based on illegitimacy should be subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny insofar as they discriminate against individuals on· 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641,42 (19(i9); Schneiderv. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling 
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
70 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420(1961); Royster Guana Co. v. Virginia, 253 
U.S. 412 (1920). 
71 See note 49 supra. 
72 See notes 12-20 and accompanying text supra. 
73 Gunther, The Supreme Court, /971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Mode/fora Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 8 (1972). 
74 /d. at 8-10. Classifications based on race, see, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184 (1964), national origin, see, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 ( 1948), and alienage, 
see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), have all been deemed worthy of strict 
scrutiny. Similarly, legislation has been found to deny equal protection where it impinged on 
"fundamental interests" of the individual: voting, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), travel, see e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), 
procreation, see, e.g., Skinner v.Oklahoma,316 U.S. 535 (1942), and criminal appeals, see, 
e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Although, theoretically, a state can constitution-
ally classify on these grounds if the interest it seeks to further is deemed "compelling," 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S 618, 638 (1969), in practice, few interests have satisfied the 
compelling state interest test. But see Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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the basis of their birth status. 75 Like the suspect classifications of 
race, alienage, and national origin, illegitimacy is not only a charac-
teristic of birth beyond the individual's control, 76 but it also is one 
which has traditionally attracted extensive social opprobrium. 77 In 
terms of the "traditional indicia of suspectness," illegitimates have 
clearly been subjected to a ''history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, and have been saddled with ... disabilities, " 78 not because 
of any inadequacy or defect inherent in the class or its members, 
but as a result of a cultural bias against perceived immorality which 
inaccurately, and unfairly, stigmatizes the blameless. 79 
Until recently, the Supreme Court has been favorably disposed 
towards the use of the strict level of scrutiny in its treatment of the 
equal protection problems posed by illegitimates.80 In Levy v. 
Louisiana, 81 the Court emphasized its sensitivity to "basic civil 
rights," and its willingness to strike down instances of historical 
and traditional invidious discrimination.82 With reference to the 
Louisiana wrongful death statute, the Court stated that "it is in-
vidious to discriminate against [illegitimates] when no action, con-
duct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that 
was done the mother. " 83 Writing for the Court, Justic Douglas was 
possibly referring to fundamental rights when. describing "[t]he 
75 See Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 46. at 15-17; Krause, supra note 46, at 488. See also 
Alito, Equal Protection and Classifications Based on Family Membership, 80 DICK. L. REV. 
4IO (1976), and Comment, The Expanding Rights of the Illegitimate, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
135 (1970), for discussions of possibly fundamental interests of the illegitimate. 
76 See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 
1126-27 ( 1969). A similar argument on behalf of sex as a suspect classification has met with 
the approval of a plurality of the Court. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Frontiero, the plurality opinion identified sex 
as an immutable birth characteristic bearing little relation to the individual's ability to 
contribute to society, 411 U.S. at 686-87, and supported the proposition that the burden 
imposed should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. Id. at 686, citing Weber 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). The opinion went on to dismiss 
administrative convenience as a sufficient justification for a scheme which required a male 
spouse to prove dependency on his military wife but presumed a wife's dependency on her 
military husband. 411 U.S. at 688-89. 
77 Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 46, at 6. 
78 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973). 
79 See Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on 
Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REv. 829, 830 (1966). 
80 See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 109 
(Marshall, J., dissenting): "Status of birth, like the color of one's skin, is something which 
the individual cannot control, and should generally be irrelevant in legislative considera-
tions. Yet, illegitimacy has long been stigmatized by our society. Hence, discrimination on 
the basis of birth-particularly when it affects-innocent children-warrants specialjudicial 
consideration." Justice Stewart, concurring in the majority decision, commented: "But 
there are other classifications [besides race] that, at least in some settings, are also 
'suspect'-for example, those based upon national origin, alienage, indigency, or illegiti-
macy." Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted). 
81 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra. 
82 391 U.S. at 71. 
83 Id. at 72. 
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rights asserted here [as involving] the intimate, familial relationship 
between a child and its own mother. " 84 Both the thrust of the 
Court's analysis and the decision to strike down the discrimination 
may be viewed as reflecting the scrutiny appropriate to a suspect 
classification. 85 
Nevertheless, the court has refused to declare illegitimacy a 
suspect classification.86 In fact, in Giana v. American Guaratee & 
Liability Co., 87 the Court used language often associated with the 
more lenient, minimal level of scrutiny .88 The contrasting language 
of Levy and Giana, and the implicit decision not to designate 
i'.legitimacy a suspect classification may, however, be reconciled 
by considering the nature of the discrimination before the Court. 
The Court faced a particularly blatant form of discrimination in 
both cases and may have desired to avoid a sweeping holding 
where a narrower one would accomplish its objective. Con-
sequently, there was no need to find a suspect classification, since 
the legislative schemes under scrutiny did not even satisfy the 
"rational basis" test. 
In Mathews v. Lucas, 89 the Court's refusal to find illegitimacy to 
be a suspect classification90 was based, in part, upon a view of 
Levy and Weber as cases. involving less-than-strict scrutiny. The 
Court noted that illegitimacy, unlike race or sex, does not carry 
"an obvious badge. " 91 Consequently, having never faced dis-
crimination as severe or pervasive as that experienced by women 
and blacks,92 illegitimates were deemed not to require the greater 
degree of judicial protection afforded to those groups. The Court's 
observation is not persuasive in view of the fact that national origin 
and alienage, despite their invisibility, have been considered "sus-
pect" classifications.93 Although the decision in Lucas may be 
8.4 Id. at 71. Although he did not elaborate, Justice Douglas may have been alluding to a 
fundamental interest in privacy (see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)), perhaps in an attempt to analogize equal protec-
tion of the illegitimate to the basic civil rights previously reviewed in the opinion. 
85 .Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406.U.S. 164 (1972), also contains language charac-
teristic of strict scrutiny analysis. In that case, the Court found no state interest, "compel-
ling or otherwise," id. at 176, sufficient to justify the discrimination and struck down the 
offending provision of the Louisiana workmen's compensation statute. 
86 See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra. 
87 391 U.S. 73 (1968). See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra. 
88 See notes 155-58 and accompanying text infra. It can be argued, too, that Weber's 
connection with the two-tier system is more semantic than substantial. See notes 95-115 and 
accompanying text infra. See also Yackle, Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr. Justice Powell and 
the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 181, 
207-10 (1975). 
89 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
90 Id. at 503-06. 
91 Id. at 506. 
92 Id. 
93 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Oyama v. California, 332 
U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin). The Court's reliance here on the visibility of a trait as a 
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read by some as dispositive of the issue, it is possible to interpret 
the decision much more restrictively.94 
B. A Newer Equal Protection 
Some commentators have suggested that the Court's recent de-
cisions reflect a growing reluctance to apply the "either-or" two-
tier analysis and that the Court is developing a new level of 
scrutiny somewhere between minimal and strict.95 This "newer" 
equal protection approach has been described as a "means-
focused, relatively narrow, preferred ground of decision" standard 
based on the principle that ''legislative means must substantially 
further legislative ends. " 96 This means-oriented analysis rejects 
the unquestioning deference to legislatures often associated with a 
minimal level of scrutiny in favor of a more exacting level of 
scrutiny based less on judicial hypothesis than on expressed legis-
lative purpose and other evidence presented to the Court.97 The 
continued expansion of strict scrutiny, with its implicit normative 
assessments of legislative purpose, is checked by the new stand-
ard, which reflects a "more modest interventionism" on the part of 
the Court. 98 
Under this level of scrutiny, classifications involving illegitimacy 
have been susceptible to successful equal protection challenges.99 
Determining whether the means chosen "substantially further" the 
legislative ends requires the Court to identify and balance the 
interests of the illegitimate claimant against those of the state. 100 In 
general, the illegitimate' s interest is in the unrestricted receipt of 
benefits to which he would have been entitled except for his birth 
criterion for determining the permissibility of the classification is open to question as well. 
~ee Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The fact that illegitimacy 
1s not as apparent to the observer as sex or race does not make this governmental classifica-
tion any less odious."). 
94 See notes 132-49 and accompanying text irifra. 
95 Gunther, supra note 73, at 17-20; Yackle, supra note 88, at 191-94. 
This article's division of the equal protection analysis into three segments is not meant to 
imply that no other alternatives exist. In particular, Justice Marshall has outlined a flexible 
"sliding scale" whose levels of scrutiny are determined according to the importance of the 
interests at stake and the reasonableness of the legislated means of promoting the state 
interest. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 102-03 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Gunther, supra note 73, at 17-18. 
96 Gunther, supra note 73, at 20. 
97 Id. at 21. 
98 Id. Nonetheless, an argument can be made for the continuing viability of suspect 
classifications and fundamental interests as deserving of special attention. Id. at 24. 
99 E.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977); Jimenez v. Wein-
berger. 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Gomez v. Perez. 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
'"
0 The Weber Court formulated a new equal protection test in terms of a "dual inquiry." 
First, what legitimate state interest does the classification promote? Second. what funda-
mental rights might the classification endanger? 406 U.S. at 173. 
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status. 101 The state's competing interest in denying or limiting 
those benefits has usually been expressed in terms of general social 
policy or the specific purposes of a particular statute. In the case of 
illegitimates, states have cited their interest in the protection of 
legitimate family relationships 102 and the strengthening of the fam-
ily unit' 03 to discourage illicit sexual activity .104 In addition, the 
specific purposes of individual statutes, such as providing general 
financial support, 105 the replacement of lost support, 106 or the 
orderly distribution of property, 107 may reflect a general state 
interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens. Finally, courts 
have recognized legitimate state interests in the efficient adminis-
tration of social insurance programs: the prevention of fraud, 108 
administrative convenience, 109 and the circumvention of difficult 
problems of proof. 110 
The "substantial relation" between legislative ends and means 
required by the intermediate level of scrutiny has proven difficult 
to establish, especially in cases where illegitimates were excluded 
from a statutory scheme with the primary purpose of providing 
support111 or loss compensation. 112 Attempts to justify the exclu-
sion on family protection or administrative grounds have been 
unsuccessful where the interest of the illegitimate in receiving 
benefits coincides with the express statutory purpose of providing 
'"' See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Davis v. Richardson. 342 F. 
Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972). ajf'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). 
102 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co .. 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972); Glona v. American Guar. & 
Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968). See also Parker v. Department of Health, Educ. & 
Welfare, 453 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C. 
1972); Morris v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 464 
(1973). 
103 Parker v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 453 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1972); 
Williams v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Morris v. Richardson, 346 F. 
Supp. 494 (N .D. Ga. 1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 464 (1973). 
10
• Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
105 Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Tanner v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 52 (6th 
Cir. 1975); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972), ajf'd mem., 409 U.S. 
1069 (1972). 
106 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Watts v. Veneman, 476 F.2d 529 (D. C. Cir. 
1973); Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Md. 1973), vacated, 418 U.S. 902 
(1974), on remand, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Md. 1975), ajf'd sub nom .. Norton v. Mathews, 
427 U.S. 524 (1976). 
107 Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
108 Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); 
Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), ajf'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974). 
109 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
110 Perry v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1971). But see Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 
F.2d at 307: "[W]hat is significant about these cases [Levy and Glona] is the Court's 
implicit, if not explicit, disavowal of the notion that difficulties of proof are a sufficient, or 
indeed rational. basis for discriminating against illegitimates." See also Gomez v. Perez, 409 
U.S. 535. 538 (1973). (Problems of proof are not to be made into an "impenetrable barrier" 
which shields "otherwise invidious discrimination."). 
111 Jimenez v. _Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
112 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co:, 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
_(1968); Glona v._ American Guar. & Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
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those benefits. 113 When other factors, such as the Court's tradi-
tional deference to state prerogatives 114 or a reluctance to expand 
the scope of a support statute,115 have been determinative, the 
interests of the illegitimate have not prevailed. 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 116 and Jimenez v. Wein-
berger111 illustrate the Court's willingness to strike down discrimi-
nation against illegitimates by employing the new middle-level 
scrutiny. In both cases, interests of illegitimates were held to be 
paramount when weighed against the state's interest in providing 
support and protecting the family .118 In Weber, which involved the 
rights of illegitimates under Louisiana's workmen's compensation 
statute, the Court considered whether there was a "significant 
relationship" between legislative means and ends, rather than rely-
ing upon either the "rational basis" or the "compelling interest" 
test of the two-tier approach to reach its decision.11 9 
Similarly, the Jimenez Court, citing Weber with approval, 120 
struck down a challenged Social Security provision, not on the 
basis of a suspect classification or rational basis analysis, but 
rather by means of an extended examination of the degree to which 
the legislative classification successfully promoted the statutory 
purpose. 121 
In Mathews v. Lucas, 122 the Court elaborated on its view of 
equal protection with respect to illegitimates. While rejecting sus-
pect status for illegitimacy, 123 the Court described the appropriate 
level of scrutiny as being "less than strictest scrutiny" but "not a 
toothless one;" 124 more importantly, the Court attempted to clarify 
its role in such cases. The Court expressed its unwillingness to 
substitute its judgment for that of Congress in '' matters of practical 
113 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
(1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
114 Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1971). 
115 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
116 406 U.S. 164 (1972). See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra. 
117 417 U.S. 628 (1974). See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra. 
118 Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628,632 (1974); Weberv. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 
U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972). 
119 See note 100 supra. In addition, the Court showed no signs of confining itself to 
traditional patterns of equal protection analysis. Language in Weber was drawn freely from 
both the stricter level-"compelling" interests, and "illogical and unjust''. results, id. at 
175-76---and the more lenient level of scrutiny-"legitimate" and "rational" state interests, 
id. at 173, 174. 
120 417 U.S. at 632. 
121 417 U.S. at 633-37. 
122 427 U.S. 495 (1976). See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra. 
123 Id. at 503-06. 
124 Id. at 510; but see id. at 519-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (regretting the Court's failure 
to enunciate the appropriate level of scrutiny with greater precision). The Court, however, 
in Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395, 4396 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977), was able to use the 
Lucas level of judicial scrutiny to invalidate the challenged provision of the Illinois intestacy 
statute. 
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judgment and empirical calculation." 125 Rather the Court viewed 
its role as "simply to determine whether Congress' assumptions 
are so inconsistent or insubstantial as not to be reasonably suppor-
tive of its conclusions. " 126 In view of that limitation, the Court 
refused to scrutinize more strictly the precision or accuracy of the 
legislative classification. The classification will be upheld if it satis-
fies the threshold determination of consistency and substantial-
ity _ 127 
The Lucas Court rejected the illegitimates' assertion of uncon-
stitutionality because it found a "reasonable relation" between the 
classification and the likelihood of the children's dependency on 
their absent father at the time of his death. 128 The Court perceived 
the congressional purpose behind the classification to be "obvi-
ously" administrative convenience, since the classification 
avoided the increased burden and expense of case-by-case adjudi-
cation .129 The Court's assessment of the importance of the state 
interests was reinforced by its unwillingness to find that the other 
factors involved in the classification 130 "lack any substantial rela-
tion to the likelihood of actual dependency." 131 Finding that these 
assumptions were not "so inconsistent or insubstantial" as to 
warrant rejection, the Court upheld the classification. 
The difficulty with the Court's analysis in Lucas is its failure. 
either to follow Jimenez or to repudiate it despite both claims 
arising out of similar statutory requirements and presenting a simi-
lar array of competing interests. Both cases challenged the stat-
utory requirement of proof of dependency at the time of the event 
insured against. 132 In Jimenez, the Court decided against a strict 
12• 427 U.S. at 515. 
126 Id. at 516. 
127 Id. See Gunther, supra note 73, at 20-24. The sharp dissent by Justice Stevens may 
indicate that the transition is not yet complete. "[A)n admittedly illogical and unjust result 
should not be accepted without both a better explanation and something more than a 
'possibly rational' basis .... [T]he Court should be especially vigilant in examining any 
classification which involves illegitimacy." 427 U.S. at 519-20. 
128 427 U.S. at 510-16. 
12 • Id. at 509. 
130 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1970) (state intestacy statutes); 42 U.S.C. § 
4l6(h)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i) (1970) (documented proofs of paternity). 
131 427 U.S. at 513. After considering the Court's attempt to indicate the substantiality of 
the relation between the likelihood of dependency and the illegitimate's inclusion in an 
intestate succession scheme, Justice Stevens described the effort as involving "nebulous 
inference upon inference." Id. at 522. See also Norton v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (D. 
Md. 1975), ajf'd sub nom., Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976). The district court in 
Norton, while upholding the statutory classifications, based its decision in part on the failure 
ot: § 402(d)(3) (the presumption of dependency) to include a reference to children qualifying 
through § 416(h)(2)(A) (inclusion within an intestacy scheme). But see note 11 supra. The 
omission was crucial, in the court's opinion, because if a child was deemed dependent "due 
to the unrelated circumstance" of his treatment under local intestacy laws, "a significant 
question would be raised about the rational basis for the statutory scheme." 390 F. Supp. at 
1090 n.7. 
~ / 132 42 U.S.C. § 416(h}(3)(A}(ii}, (C}(ii) (1970). Other courts have also made marginal 
· inroads on the requirement. See. e.g .. Severance v. Weinberger 362 F. Supp. 1348 
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application of that provision to the after-born, presently dependent 
children of the insured. The Lucas children, on the other hand, 
could not prove their dependency since their father was not living 
with them at the time of his death. The Court distinguished the 
cases on the ground that, while the statute was an absolute bar to 
the illegitimates in Jimenez without regard to their actual depen-
dency, nothing in the statute similarly prevented the Lucas chil-
dren from proving cohabitation or contribution.1 33 The distinction, 
however, is actually not as clear as the opinion would indicate .134 
The Court could view the Social Security Act either as providing 
support to all eligible recipients 135 or as specifically replacing the 
support lost by the recipient upon the withdrawal of the insured 
parent from the work force. 136 If the Court is inclined to view 
actual dependency (i.e., the receipt of support from the insured) as 
a prerequisite to the receipt of benefits, it is also likely to be 
persuaded by a justification of the legislative classification as based 
upon the likelihood of dependency. Conversely, if the Court views 
the statute in terms of a right to support, then actual dependency, 
although relevant, will not be a conclusive factor in determining 
eligibility. Consequently, arguments based upon the likelihood of 
dependency are less persuasive than those which attempt to estab-
lish the claimant's right to support. 
The Court in Jimenez adopted the broader of the two views 
despite the government's assertion that illegitimates, as a class, are 
not as likely to have been dependent on the wage earner as other 
children. Concluding that this view would bar children born after 
the event insured against, as well as thos·e,who had never received 
actual support prior to that event, the Court refused to read the 
statute as supporting such an interpretation. 137 Although the opin-
ion reflected the particular circumstances of the parties before it, . 
the Court was generally sympathetic to the plight of those illegiti-
(D.D.C: 1973) (The court reversed the denial of benefits of a child born after his father 
reached sixty-five and fully supported since that time despite the sheer impossibility of 
meeting the 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii) requirement.); Wagner v. Finch, 413 F.2d 267 (5th 
Cir. I 969) (A posthumous child is entitled to benefits on the grounds that the fetus is 
sufficiently "in being" to be "lived. with" per 42 U .S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).). 
133 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,512 (1976). 
134 Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The difference between this justification [of 
administrative convenience] and the argument rejected in Jimenez" is "opaque and insuffi-
cient."). 
135 See note 98 supra. 
136 See note 99 supra. 
137 Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974). In addition, the operation of the 
presumption itself was found to be unfair on the grounds of both over- and under-
inclusiveness (i.e .. it inevitably presumes the dependency of some children who are in fact 
not dependent, while simultaneously barring the claims of those who are not "entitled" to 
the presumption but who are actually dependent.). Id. at 637. 
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mates falling outside the presumptively dependent categories. 138 
Consequently, the Court found the "likelihood" arguments, even 
when coupled with the governmental interest in the prevention of 
fraud, 139 insufficient to justify the discrimination against the il-
legitimate claimants. 
The Court in Lucas implicitly adopted the narrower interpreta-
tion of the statute's purpose. Restating the government's conten-
tion that the "actual support" theory reflected congressional in-
tent, the Court accepted "this explanation at face value," 140 Such 
a fundamental shift.has consequences which significantly limit ·the 
scope of the statute and which place Lucas squarely at odds with 
the result and rationale of Jimenez. - , 
The Court may have accepted the ''actual support" theory too 
uncritically. As the following discussion suggests, that theory un-
fairly discim-inates against i_llegitimates, a result that can be avoided 
by interpreting the statute in terms of a child's right to support. 
Due 'to the operation of the presumption of dependency, 141 the 
majority of child recipients are granted benefits without reference 
to their dependency. The presumption is extended to all legitimate 
children 142 and to those illegitimates who meet a series of qualify-
ing conditions. 143 From these groups no proof of dependency is 
required, and undisputed evidence to the contrary will not disqual-
ify them. 144 In fact, the "actual support" theory is applied only 
with respect to those illegitimates who are statutorily required to 
prove both paternity and dependency. 145 
The fact of legitimacy and the qualifying provisions of the statute 
may be viewed as evidence, not of actual support, but of the 
claimant's right to support, 146 which entitles the claimant to re-
138 Id. at 636. "[I]t would not serve the purpose of the Act to conclusively deny them an 
opportunity to establish their dependency and their right to insurance benefits." 
139 Id. 
1• 0 427 U.S. at 507. The Court's reliance on the dependency arguments throughout the 
opinion and the degree to which they were found persuasive are additional evidence that the 
Court was employing that interpretation. Id. at 507-16. See, e.g., id. at 508-09, where the 
Court referred to the "obvious fact" that the presumption is "incrementally over-inclusive" 
but permissible, in any case, because of its reasonable relation to the likelihood of the 
_ illegitimate's dependency. 
141 42 U .S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970). The presumption of dependency is, in effect, the stat-
utory formulation of the conclusions drawn by the government as to the likelihood of 
dependency. 
142 Id. 
143 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)-(h)(3)(A)(i), (h)(3)(B)(i), (h)(3)(C)(i) (1970). See notes 7-11 and 
accompanying text supra. 
144 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
145 These illegitimates qualify through 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii) (1970). 
146 The adoption of the "right to support" theory presents the threshold task of defining 
the nature of the right. As used in this discussion, the term refers to a right to support which 
is legally enforceable against a delinquent parent. The advantage of the definition is its 
compatibility with the present statutory scheme, one of whose qualifying provisions for 
_illegitimates currently grants "child" status upon production of a judicial support order or 
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ceive benefits. Viewed from this perspective, the children who 
currently benefit from the operation of the dependency presump-
tion are those legally entitled to support147 and those "entitled" 
because of their status under selected state laws. 148 Since the 
presumption operates without reference to the support actually 
received by the claimant, entitlement to support may be viewed as 
a question of paternity rather than dependency. If so, the imposi-
tion of the additional burden of proving dependency on illegiti-
mates able to prove paternity is unnecessary, unfairly exclusive, 
and inconsistent with the policy of the statute. A broader interpre-
tation of statutory purpose, focused on the question of the child's 
right to support, would not only provide a theoretical foundation 
consistent with the practical effect of the statute, but would also 
avoid the inevitable imprecision of classifications based upon the 
presumed likelihood of actual dependency .1g 
paternity decree. 42 U.S.C § 416(h)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i) (1970). A shortcoming of the 
proposition is the introduction of state law into an act of national scope and application. In 
the absence of federal guidelines, the right to support, and hence the right to benefits, will be 
determined by local statutes. But see Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (invalidating on 
equal protection grounds a Texas statute denying the right of paternal support to illegiti-
mates while granting it to legitimates). It should also be noted that the Act presently 
countenances the use of state law, not only with respect to the enforceable right to support, 
but with regard to intestate succession and the validity of marriage ceremonies as well. 42 
U .S.C. § 416(h)((2)(A), (2)(B) (1970). 
147 Legal entitlement results either from legitimacy or from the right to support becoming 
judicially enforceable. 42 U .S.C. §§ 416(h)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i) (1970). 
148 Special status is conferred by those statutes governing intestate succession, id. § 
416(h)(2)(A), and the validity of the parents' marriage ceremony, id. § 416(h)(2)(B). Al-
though the value of these provisions as evidence of dependency has been questioned, see 
note 131 supra, they may nevertheless be indicative of a child's right to support. It can be 
argued that the child's inclusion within an intestacy scheme or the parents' participation in a 
marriage ceremony are indirect evidence of membership in a" sanctioned" family structure 
which, once established, "entitles" the child to support. 
This social concept of "entitlement" can be perceived in the intestate succession, com-
pensation, and support statutes which exclude illegitimates from their operation. One view 
of these statutes interprets the inclusion or exclusion of illegitimates as the result of an 
assumption that an unconventional or "nonfamily" relationship does not "entitle" the child 
to support, compensation, or a share in the estate. This assumption can be obscured by 
statutory emphasis on "tests," such as dependency. which determine the suitability of the 
family relationship involved. To the extent that a statutory classification is based on this 
kind of assumption, and excludes illegitimates, it can be argued that it does so on grounds 
that are impermissibly subjective and which bear no justifiable relation to the disadvantaged 
individual-the child who is clearly not responsible for the family context into which he or 
she is born. Indeed, the argument seems to suggest that the appropriateness of any examina-
tion of the family context is highly questionable. 
149 In the event that the Court continues to find the "likelihood" arguments persuasive, 
the statute can still be challenged on the grounds that the presumption of dependency is in 
fact an invalid irrebuttable presumption. In other contexts, the Court has found a denial of 
due process when the presumption implied by the original facts is not "necessarily or 
universally true in fact." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,452 (1973). See also Weinberger v. 
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United 
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). Although the conclusion is 
expressed in terms of due process, the examination of the accuracy of the classification in 
light of statutory purpose closely resembles the equal protection means-ends analysis and, 
thus, is not wholly inappropriate in this context. But see Note, The Irrebuttable Presump-
tion Doc_trine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1534 (1974) (criticizing the doctrine 
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C. Minimal Scrutiny 
Classifications involving illegitimates are subject, as are any 
legislative classifications, to at least minimal judicial scrutiny 
under the equal protection doctrine. Even on this basis, illegiti-
mates have occasionally succeeded in challenging legislative clas-
sifications.150 Minimal scrutiny has traditionally been applied to 
social and economic legislation 151 where judicial examination of 
legislative judgment is generally so deferential as to ensure a find-
ing of constitutionality .152 In order to be upheld, the legislative 
classification must only bear a "rational relation" to the statutory 
purpose .153 The Court has been willing to ·uphold a classification if 
it could determine that a conceivable set of facts might exist which 
would bear a suitably rational relation to statutory purpose. 154 
Although Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Co. 155 and 
Labine v. Vincent 156 contain language reflecting the "rational rela-
tion" requirement, 157 both have peculiarities which make this an 
as an unfounded hybrid of equal protection and due process theory, id. at 1547, and a 
thinly-veiled, expanded version of strict scrutiny, id. at 1553). 
In Jimenez. the Court found the "blanket and conclusive exclusion" invalid to the extent 
that actually dependent illegitimates were being denied both the benefits and the opportunity 
to prove their dependent status.· The implication which arose from the presumption's 
operation-that they were not dependent-was not "necessarily or universally true in fact." 
417 U.S. at 636. See also Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), affd, 418 U.S. 
901 (1974); Severance v. Weinberger, 362 F. Supp. 1348 (D.D.C. 1973). 
In Jimenez. an irrebuttable presumption of nondependency was used to exclude claimants 
who were actually dependent but unable to prove dependency "at the time" of their father's 
disability. The Lucas challenge was similarly prompted by the inability to prove dependency 
"at the time" of the parent's death. Despite the rejection of the Lucas claim, both cases 
demonstrate the continuing reliance on dependency as the criterion entitling the child to 
statutory benefits. 
Adoption of the "right to support" theory, however, permits the presumption to be 
rejected on other, more consistent grounds. Under this view, the provision irrebuttably 
presumes that illegitimates able to prove paternity, but not dependency, are not entitled to 
benefits. If, however, paternity is the actual key to entitlement, then the presumption of 
nonentitlement is not "necessarily or universally true in fact" and can be rejected on that 
basis. See notes 146-48 and accompanying text supra. 
150 See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1%8); Tanner v. Weinberger, 
525 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); 
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
151 E.g .. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 
483 (1955). 
152 Gunther, supra note 73, at 8. See also Note, Developments in the Law-Equal 
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). 
153 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas 
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
154 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). 
155 391 U.S. 73 (1968). See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra. 
156 401 U.S. 532 (1971). See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra. 
157 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), contains language which focuses 
on the irrationality of the relation between the legislative classification and statutory pur-
pose. "[V]isiting this condemnation [of extra-marital liaisons] on the head of an infant is 
illogical and unjust." Id. at 175. Weber is better seen, however, as an early example of 
middle-level scrutiny. See notes 95-115 and accompanying text supra. See also Trimble v. 
Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395, 43% (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 19771. 
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inappropriate categorization. The Court in Glona most clearly in-
dicated that it was exercising minimal scrutiny. The Court noted 
that it saw "no rational basis for assuming that if the natural 
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegiti-
mate child, the cause of illegitimacy would be served. " 158 Signifi-
cantly, the Court struck down the classification in issue, a result 
more often associated with a stricter standard of review .159 
Labine, on the other hand, involved a classification which was 
upheld following the perfunctory application of a "rational basis" 
test. "Even if we were to apply the 'rational basis' test to the 
Louisiana intestate succession statute, that statute clearly has a 
rational basis .... " 160 Nonetheless, this result could as easily be 
attributed to traditional judicial acquiescence in state judgments 
with respect to local intestacy matters. 161 
III. CONCLUSION 
Illegitimates suffer significant legal disabilities under social in-
surance, loss compensation, and intestate succession statutes as a 
result of a social prejudice which brings the full force of its moral 
judgment to bear on blameless children. Legislative discrimination 
on the basis of illegitimacy is vulnerable, however, to judicial 
invalidation at all levels of scrutiny under the equal protection 
doctrine. The unequal imposition of additional burdens of proof or 
persuasion violates the most basic concepts of fairness implicit in 
that doctrine. 
A strong argument can be presented that classifications based on 
illegitimacy-an unalterable trait of birth over which the stig-
matized extramarital child has no control-are analogous to the 
suspect classifications of race, national origin, and alienage, and 
thus should be subject to the same strict level of judicial scrutiny 
under the equal protection clause. Alternatively, the interests of 
illegitimates may be found to outweigh those of the state under a 
158 391 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added), Justice Harlan's dissent supports this.conclusion, id. 
at 79, although his descripton of Levy and Glona as "constitutional curiosities" underscores 
a deeper dissatisfaction with the results reached. "The Court has reached ... [an] answer 
... by a process that can only be described as brute force." Id. at 76. 
159 An argument can be raised that Levy ·also belongs in this category despite the tendency 
of its references to lean towards a stricter scrutiny approach; the opinion is perhaps 
ambiguous enough to permit placement in either level. 
160 401 U.S. at 536 n.6 (1971) (emphasis added). 
161 See notes 47, 62-68 and accompanying text supra. The Court itself has found Labine 
"difficult to place in the pattern of ... equal protection decisions"··concerning illegitimates. 
Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395, 4396 n.12 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977). · 
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newly emerging middle-level scrutiny, involving an examination of 
the statute's purpose and the means chosen to effectuate it. Fin-
ally, illegitimates can successfully challenge discriminatory clas-
sifications on the ground that the scheme lacks a rational relation to 
its own goals, thus failing to weather even the minimal level of 
equal protection scrutiny. The past vulnerability of legislative dis-
crimination to these challenges justifies the hope that continued 
pressure will ultimately result in the elimination of legally 
sanctioned prejudice against illegitimate children. 
-David Hallissey 
